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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF
AMENITY, INC.

RESPONSE AND BRIEF IN
PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

CAPITAL GENERAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Docket No.

UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION,

Court of Appeals No.
870567-CA

890339

Priority No. 13
Defendant/Respondents.
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Utah Securities Division and the Department of Business
Regulation, respondents herein, by and through Mark J. Griffin,
Assistant Attorney General, file this Response and Brief in
Partial Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to
Rule 47, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant presents three issues for review:

First, was the

appellant transaction a sale of securities within the meaning of
§61-1-13(15)(a); second, were the purported gifts of stock in
"good faith"; and third, was the Utah Securities Advisory Board
acting within its statutory authority when it entered an order
pursuant to §61-1-14(3) suspending the use of all secondary
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trading exemptions for the securities of Amenity, Inc., its
affiliates and successors.
The Respondents, with the clarifications as follow herein,
do not oppose the petition on the first issue.

However, the

Respondents do oppose the granting of the Writ on the second and
third issues, for the reasons set out hereinafter.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Review is sought of a July 3, 1989 decision rendered by the
Utah Court of Appeals.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction

to review this matter by a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to §78-22(5), Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
The Appellant has cited the following sections as being
controlling this matter: §§61-1-7, 61-1-13(15), 61-1-14(3), and
61-1-20, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended).

In addition to the

sections of the statute as above-cited, the Respondents believe
that §61-1-24(1) and §61-1-14.5, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as
amended) are also controlling in this matter:
The Division may from time to time make,
amended and rescind such rules, forms and
orders as are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter...
U.C.A. §61-1-24 (1)
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil,
criminal, administrative or judicial, the
burden of providing an exemption under §61-114 or an exception from a definition under
§61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the
exemption or exception.
U.C.A. §61-1-14.5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellant has requested the Writ of Certiorari for the
purpose of reviewing the final decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals issued July 3, 1989, upholding the order of the Third
Judicial District Court, in

upholding the final order of the

Utah Securities Division suspending the use of all secondary
trading exemptions available to the securities of Amenity, Inc.,
its affiliates and successors, entered February 18, 1987.
B.

Course of Proceedings

On June 5, 1989, the Utah Securities Division brought an
Administrative action pursuant to §61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act (the "Act"), alleging that a distribution of stock
in Amenity, Inc., was in violation of §61-1-7 of the Act.

The

petition sought the suspension of all possible exemptions for
further trading of Amenity stock without registration.

The

Administrative Law Judge issued his Finding of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Recommended Order on October 28, 1986.

On January 8,

1987, the Division issued an order adopting limited provisions of
the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law but specifically rejected the Judge's determination of
whether the distribution was in fact sale of securities, and
whether the distribution of Amenity stock constituted a "good
faith" gift.

The January 8th order of the Division called for an

evidentiary hearing to be held on January 20, 1987, for the
purpose of determining whether the distribution of Amenity stock
was an effort to frustrate or circumvent the registration
provisions of the Act.
- 3 -

Following the hearing held on January 20, 1987, the Division
issued an order on February 18, 1987 suspending the use of all
secondary trading exemptions for the securities of Amenity, Inc.,
its affiliates and successors.
On April 16, 1987, Appellant appealed the Division's order
to the Third Judicial District Court. After reviewing the briefs
on file, examining the record of the administrative proceedings,
and after conducting a hearing on September 17, 1987, the
District Court issued its order upholding the Final Order of the
Division.
Appellant thereafter appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals,
and, following review of briefs submitted and hearing, the Utah
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Third District Court
on July 3, 1989. Appellant now applies for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals for its decision of July 3, 1989.
C.

Statement of the Facts

1.

Amenity was incorporated in the State of Utah on

January 7, 1986.

On January 8, 1986, one million shares of

Amenity stock were issued to Appellant in exchange for $2,000.00
cash.

At least two of the officers and directors of the

Appellant were incorporators and directors of Amenity.

The

$2,000.00 which Amenity received from the Appellant was the only
asset of Amenity at the time of the filing of the Division's
administrative petition.
2.

After receiving the one million shares of Amenity

stock, Appellant distributed to approximately 900 different
individuals and organizations one hundred shares of stock each.

3.

Appellant filed no registration with Utah Securities

Division for the distribution of the shares issued to the 900
individuals and entities,
4.

According to Appellant, the purpose of the distribution

to the 900 individuals was to reward them for past association,
loyalty, and to enhance the general exposure of the Appellant's
financial consulting business to persons in the financial world,
thus creating general and specific good will.
5.

Appellant engaged in a major campaign of incorporating

over 30 other companies by the same means and distributing the
shares, again to a wide range of individuals and entities, in a
fashion similar to the distribution which took place with regard
to Amenity stock.
6.

In the summer of 1986, Amenity, Inc. was acquired by

Elkin Weiss Companies, Inc. Appellant was instrumental in the
acquisition of Amenity and received $25,000.00 from Elkin Weiss
for its role in the acquisition and for its Amenity Stock.
7.

At the time of the Division's administrative hearing in

January, Elkin Weiss' unrestricted stock was trading at
approximately $3.00 a share in the open market.

The Division

thus found that the purpose of the distribution of Amenity stock
was to circumvent or evade the Act and the registration
provisions contained therein.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE FINDING OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT
WITH A PRIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT, ANDREWS V, CHASE,
89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935).
In its petition appellant relies heavily upon the holding of
Andrews V, Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 838 (1935).

The reliance

by the appellant on the Andrews case is misplaced.

Andrews was

decided in 1935 under a statute which in some significant points
is different from the current Utah Uniform Securities Act.

A

plain reading of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and amendments
thereto would indicate that it was the legislative intent that
the Andrews opinion be legislatively overruled.
there purported to be a gift of assessable stock.

In Andrews,
The Andrews

opinion held that the purported gift was not a "sale" within the
meaning of the Securities Act.
In its enactment of the Utah Uniform Securities Act in 1963,
the legislature, in the definitional section of the Act, provided
that "a purported gift of assessable stock is considered to
involve an offer or sale."

U.C.A. §61-1-13(10)(d) (1965 Supp.)

In 1983, the legislature went further in strengthening the
language of this particular section.

"A purported gift of

assessable stock ijs an offer or sale, as is each assessment
levied on the stock."
(emphasis added.)

U.C.A. §61-1-13(14)(c)(ii) (1983 Supp.)

The conclusion can be drawn from the language

of these two amendments that the legislature specifically
intended that purported gifts of assessable stock be offers or
sales of securities within the meaning of §7 of the Utah Uniform

Act,

Additionally, the conclusion may be drawn that the

legislature also considers that some other forms of "purported
gifts of stock" could be interpreted as sales of securities
within the meaning of §7 of the Act.
This conclusion is strengthened by the existence of a 1983
amendment to §61-1-13 which excluded from the definition of sale
a "good faith gift."

Utah Code Ann., §61-1-13(14)(d)(i) (1983

Supp.) provides "the terms defined in subsection (a) and (b) do
not include (i) a good faith gift."

It stands to reason, that

when the legislature intended to exclude from the definition of
offer of sale "good faith" gifts, it contemplated categories of
gifts that would not satisfy the "good faith" requirement and
could be considered "offers or sales" within the meaning of §7 of
the Act.
In light of these recent amendments to Utah Uniform
Securities Act, the Respondent urges the Court to take up the
narrow question of whether Andrews ought to be specifically
overruled.
If the Court were to take the position that there remains a
portion of the Andrews opinion which was not legislatively
overruled by subsequent amendments, then Respondents would argue
that the facts of this case are distinct from those presented to
the Court in Andrews, and, therefore, Andrews is not applicable
to the instant action.

Andrews presented a situation which

involved a purported gift of assessable stock.

In the instant

action, the purported gifts were, in actuality, a distribution of
stock intended to formulate a public company for the purpose of
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creating a merger vehicle whereby a private company may go public
without the necessity of registration, clearly in circumvention
of the registration provisions of the Act.

Respondent will argue

that the facts presented by this case confront the Court with
issues which are strikingly different from those presented to it
in the Andrews case.
POINT TWO
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DETERMINATION OF THE
SECURITIES DIVISION THAT THE PURPORTED GIFTS
WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

The Writ of Certiorari should not be granted to review the
determination of the Respondent that the distribution of Amenity
stock was not a "good faith gift" because the determination was
both reasonable and rational and the Appellant in its Petition
has alleged no fact or law to the contrary.
The scope of review of the Division's Administrative
decision is limited to a determination of whether the decision is
reasonable, rational and is not arbitrary or capricious.

Silver

Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission/ 30 Utah 2d.
44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973); Williams v. Public Service Commission,
29 Utah 2d 9, 504 P.2d 34, 36 (1972).
Additionally, the Utah Uniform Securities Act provides that
the burden of proving an exemption under §61-1-14 or an exception
for a definition under §61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the
exemption or exception, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14.5.
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Appellant wishes to take appeal on the point because, as
stated in the petition, Appellant perceives that "there is not a
scintilla of evidence in the record of any bad faith . • .

w
f

Appellant's Petition, at 11, and because the record has "ample
evidence of good faith."

Appellant's Petition, at 11.

To establish its good faith, Appellant points to three
factors:
1.

Intent to benefit the donees;

2.

Steps taken to develop the company; and

3.

Lack of intent to violate Section 7 of the Act.

Yet none of the three factors addresses the basis for the
Division's determination that the Appellants failed to
demonstrate "good faith".

The Court below noted:

"The Board determined CGC failed to meet this
burden [of proving the good faith exception] and
consequently held the disposition was not a "good
faith gift". This conclusion was largely based upon
the Board's finding that through the disposition CGC
intended to circumvent the Act's registration
requirement. The conclusion finds further support in
the fact that CGC's veiled but fairly obvious purpose
was to advance its own economic objections rather than
make a gift for reasons of simple generosity.
Capital General Corporation v. Utah
Department of Business Regulation 112 Utah Adv. Rep.
31, 33 (CA 7/3.89)
In short, Appellant wishes this Court to overturn the
decision of the lower Courts and the Division because Appellant
feels it can demonstrate some quantum of good faith. Appellant
does not challenge in its petition the fundamental basis for
these decisions:

that the principal aim and scheme of the

distribution was to circumvent the registration provisions of the
Act and enrich its own coffers in the process.
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Since appellant does not challenge the main basis for the
findings below, that Respondents' order was both reasonable and
rational, Respondents respectfully request that the Court refuse
to take up the second question presented for review.
POINT III
THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION HAD STATUTORY
AUTHORITY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF ITS ORDER SUSPENDING
EXEMPTION, AND, THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT
THE PETITION WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE.
The Appellant, in presentation of its third proposed question for
review, takes unwarranted encouragement from certain language in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

That opinion noted that,

"even if Capital General Corporation is technically correct in
its assertion [that the Division was not statutorily authorized
to order the challenged suspensions under §61-1-14(3)], we would
hold the error harmless."

Id at 33.

The Court of Appeals did not say the Division lacked
authority under §14 of the Act to order the suspensions, as
Appellant's petition implies, rather the Court merely pointed out
that if the Division so chose, the same result might have been
achieved under §20 of the Act; therefore, any error in this
regard would be harmless.
Appellant's Petition does not argue that the Division lacked
authority under §14 to order the suspensions but instead
elaborates upon the differences that Appellant perceives between
the available procedural and substantiative remedies under §14(3)
and §20 of the Act.

But the first question to be decided is the

existence of authority under §14(3).
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In this regard, the question presented by Appellants to the
lower Court was characterized by that Court as follows:
"CGC final contention is that §61-1-14(3) which
authorizes the Board to deny or suspend certain secondary trading
exemptions, does not authorize the order of suspension challenged
here,

CGC argues that since it is not claiming any secondary

exemption, there is no basis for the suspension and the Board
erred in issuing the ordering reliance on §61-1-14(3)."

jld at

33.
Section 14(3) of the Act provides that the Division
may by order deny or revoke any exemption
specified in Subsection [14](l)(h), [14](l)(j) or
[14] (2) with respect to (a) a specific security,
transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) any
person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a
person or issuer, or any entity subsequently
organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer
generally. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3).
Appellant contends in its petition that it is "obvious" that
§14(3) is designed to allow correction of situations where
exemptions are being claimed which should not be.

In the Court

below, Appellant made this assertion its main point of attack on
the Division's authority.

But this Court can plainly see that

there is nothing on the face of §14(3) which requires that an
exemption be affirmatively claimed before the Division may revoke
it.

For example, numerous exemptions provided for in §14(2) are

self-executing and require no affirmative filing or formal claim,
yet §14(3) clearly contemplates the Division's authority to
revoke any of the 14(2) secondary trading exemptions.
The Court below noted the existence of similar authority to
achieve similar results found elsewhere in the Act under §20.
- 11 -

Yet another source for this authority, opinion is found in §24 of
the Act:

"The Division may from time to time make, amend, and

rescind such rules, forms, and orders as are necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter . • . ." Utah Code Ann. §61-124.
This general enabling power embraces the type of order which
is the subject matter of this appeal.

There are, therefore,

three sections of the Act which provide ample authority for the
Division's order suspending all secondary trading exemption.
In conclusion, in accordance with Rule 47, Respondents urge
the Court to grant Appellant's petition, in part, for the sole
purpose of determining if the order of the Division is consistent
with previous rulings of this Court.
DATED t h i s

/ - > ~— day o f

UU\U*f

/ 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^i.

MARK Jf GRIFFIN
Assistiyax Attorney General
Attorney for the Respondents
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